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Abstract
The flourishing of studies on the neural correlates of decision-making calls for an appraisal of the relation between
perceptual decisions and conscious perception. By exploiting the long integration time of noisy motion stimuli, and by
forcing human observers to make difficult speeded decisions – sometimes a blind guess – about stimulus direction, we
traced the temporal buildup of motion discrimination capability and perceptual awareness, as assessed trial by trial through
direct rating. We found that both increased gradually with motion coherence and viewing time, but discrimination was
systematically leading awareness, reaching a plateau much earlier. Sensitivity and criterion changes contributed jointly to
the slow buildup of perceptual awareness. It made no difference whether motion discrimination was accomplished by
saccades or verbal responses. These findings suggest that perceptual awareness emerges on the top of a developing or
even mature perceptual decision. We argue that the middle temporal (MT) cortical region does not confer us the full
phenomenic depth of motion perception, although it may represent a precursor stage in building our subjective sense of
visual motion.
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Introduction
Simple perceptual decisions have become an important test-bed
for theories on decision-making. Tasks such as identifying a target
among distractors, or discriminating the direction of a noisy
motion stimulus, or making a saccade to a target, have stimulated
the development of a variety of theoretical models, which
incorporated several behavioural and neurophysiological observa-
tions [1,2,3,4]. An important outcome of these studies is the notion
that neurons in parietal and frontal regions accumulate evidence
over time until a given decision criterion is reached (rise-to-
threshold mechanisms), fuelling the idea that these neurons
implement probability ‘‘reasoning’’ to emit a verdict about the
state of the world.
Perception, however, involves crucially also a phenomenic
dimension, that is, a conscious subjective sensation, or perceptual
awareness. In the visual domain, this is what we ordinary call
‘‘seeing’’. Indeed, one of the most challenging goals for modern
neurosciences is to understand how consciousness emerges out of
non-conscious processes [5]. A way to address this issue is to
measure the perceptual delay, which implies identifying when a
sensory stimulation becomes a conscious percept [6,7]. Some
studies estimated the perceptual delay to be in the order of few
tenths of seconds [7,8,9], but the kind of stimulus and task can
affect significantly the processing time [10,11]; Degraded or
ambiguous stimuli, for example, may require much longer to be
identified [12]. However, estimating the perceptual delay is not as
easy as measuring response times, as a visuo-motor response may
not tag the moment in which we become aware of a stimulus.
Alternative approaches, such as taking the earlier difference of
certain EEG events (e.g., the latency of evoked potentials, or the
peak of induced gamma synchrony, [10,13,14]) when comparing
conditions in which a given stimulus is either seen or unseen, may
simply reveal specific precursors of conscious perception. Further,
especially with degraded stimuli, conscious perception may not be
an all-or-none phenomenon, but a continuum of clarity unfolding
in time [6,10,15], so that the notion of a precise point in time at
which the conscious sensation pops out may be too simplistic.
Therefore, when dealing with the temporal dynamics of conscious
perception, it is important to understand how perceptual
awareness builds up over time.
Despite the diffusion of studies on perceptual decision-making,
and the number of hypotheses on how the decision signal
accumulates over time [1,2,3,4,16], the temporal relation between
the objective decision performance and the associated subjective
sensation has never been investigated directly, perhaps also owing
to the above difficulties. Here we addressed this issue by jointly
assessing how visually-guided decisions and visual awareness
develop in time after stimulus onset. We took advantage of
degraded motion stimuli that entail a long processing time [12,17],
and sampled the accumulation of sensory evidence by forcing
participants to make speeded discrimination of motion direction,
with a saccade or a verbal response, at various points in time after
stimulus onset, guessing if necessary (Figure 1). In each trial,
observers rated the subjective visibility of global motion direction
through a perceptual awareness (PA) scale.
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Ethics statement
The study was conducted in accordance with the recommen-
dations of the Declaration of Helsinki and the local Ethical
Committee (‘‘Comitato etico’’, San Raffaele). Before the experi-
ments, all participants signed the informed consent.
Participants
Eight healthy observers volunteered in the main experiment (6
females and 2 males, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
aged between 22 and 34, naive as to the purpose of the experiment
except two authors). They received a book in return for the
collaboration.
Stimuli and task
Observers were seated in a darkened room about 60 cm in front
of a computer screen (Sony Trinitron, 21 inches; frame-rate:
85 Hz; resolution: 8006600 pixels; background luminance:
19 cd?m
22), with the head resting on a forehead support. The
stimuli (random dot kinematograms, Figure 1) were generated by a
custom program written in MATLAB (6.5.0 R13, The Math-
Works Inc., 2002, equipped with PsychToolbox 3), and consisted
of 100 dots (diameter =0.2 deg), half black (luminance =
0.2 cd?m
22) and half white (luminance =118 cd?m
22), moving
linearly at a velocity of 5 deg?s
21, with a lifetime of ,82 ms (7
frames), presented within a central square aperture (side =
11 deg). At each lifetime cycle, the dots were regenerated in a
different position within the screen aperture; part of them was
assigned a randomly-chosen motion direction (random motion),
while the remaining part kept moving in the same direction
(coherent motion, either rightward or leftward). The proportion of
the latter dots determined the coherence of the stimulus, which
could be 0%, 15%, 30%, or 60%.
Each trial started with the presentation of a central fixation dot
(diameter: 0.3 deg; luminance: 118 cd?m
22), followed by the
motion stimulus after a random interval comprised between 1 and
2 s (Figure 1). The offset of the fixation dot was the imperative cue
to emit immediately the response (direction discrimination task),
either verbally (‘‘right’’/’’left’’) or with the eyes (in this case the
instruction was to make a saccade in the direction of motion, to the
right or left border of the stimulus pattern). The response
terminated the stimulus within 4 video-frames. We manipulated
the duration of the fixation dot, which was switched off 0.2, 0.5, 1
or 4 s after the onset of the motion stimulus. Throughout the text,
this manipulation – an experimental factor – will be called
‘‘urgency’’, to denote the fact that, especially at 0.2 and 0.5 s, the
imperative cue forced observers to emit a sudden, early response.
Higher urgencies corresponded to shorter durations of the fixation
dot. Observers could respond before the offset of the fixation dot if
they had perceived clearly the global motion direction, which
could happen especially at the lowest urgency (4 s).
The imperative cue was quite effective in determining a prompt
response with a remarkably small variability of response times,
except at the lowest urgency (Table 1). Observes were informed
that in many cases the global motion direction might not be seen
at all, in which case the discrimination response must be a blind
guess. Before the beginning of the experiments, participants got
acquainted with the task, which required about 100–200 trials.
In the control experiment (three additional participants, 2
females and 1 male, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
aged between 22 and 27, naive as to the purpose of the
experiment) the procedure was substantially the same as in the
main experiment, except for the presence of a condition in which
the perceptual judgment (actually a simpler yes/no task, see the
Results section) was given upon the imperative cue. In another
condition it was given after the discrimination response, i.e., at the
end of the trial as in the main experiment. The two conditions
were administered in different sessions (3 for each condition, 256
trials per session) in a counterbalanced order. Motion discrimina-
tion was performed only with verbal responses, and ocular fixation
was monitored throughout the trial.
Recording procedures
The real-time stimulus presentation was monitored by means of
an analog photocell system, and the signal recorded together with
the eye position traces and the verbal traces. Eye movements
(horizontal component, monocular) were recorded through
infrared oculometry (Dr. Bouis Oculometer, nominal accuracy
,0.3 deg), while the verbal discrimination responses were
recorded with a directional microphone and an amplifier. The
analog signals were visualized in real time on an oscilloscope,
sampled through and A/D converter (16 bit, 1000 Hz), and stored
for subsequent analyses. In the verbal response experiments, trials
containing saccades or accidental utterances were discarded, and
re-presented at the end of the session. In the saccade experiments,
trials containing saccades before the offset of the fixation dot, or
small saccades (,1 deg), or ocular artifacts (e.g., eye blinks) were
discarded, and re-presented at the end of the session.
Figure 1. Stimulus and motion discrimination task. See Methods
for details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017079.g001
Table 1. Response times of the discrimination responses.
Response Times (ms)
Coherence
=15%
Coherence
=30%
Coherence
=60%
Urgency Mean S.E.M. Mean S.E.M. Mean S.E.M.
200 ms 403 25 352 35 307 40
500 ms 314 25 194 60 109 70
1 s 226 58 218 124 2230 142
4s 2652 344 21708 588 22536 536
Data are relative to the imperative cue (offset of the fixation dot). Negative
values indicate anticipation. S.E.M.: standard error of the mean across subjects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017079.t001
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In order to capture as reliably as possible the first-person,
subjective quality of visual experience [18], we used a measure of
perceptual awareness structured as a type I task with an absolute
5-points scale. Firstly, we wanted the perceptual judgment to
target specifically the visibility of the motion stimulus (type I task:
judging an external event [19]) rather than the confidence of the
observer’s own discrimination response (type II task: judging an
internal event): Being confident of the response is not equivalent of
being aware of the stimulus [20]. Secondly, we used a multi-point
scale instead of a yes/no task to capture the graded nature of
perceptual awareness [6,10,15], especially because we worked with
degraded stimuli. The number of points was chosen to make the
scale simple and comfortable for the observers: It has been shown
that four categories are enough for the PA scale to be informative,
while a high number of categories may be confusing [15]. Thirdly,
we took caution to anchor the scale to the minimum and
maximum absolute values [21], namely, null visibility and full
visibility, and ensured that participants understood that the scale
should represent a linear quantity. We insisted that the observers
assigned a score of zero only in case of complete invisibility of
global motion direction. The instructions to the participants,
which were given in both written and colloquial form, were the
following: 0= You didn’t see at all the motion direction; 1=
Between 0 and 2: you had a raw feeling of the motion direction;
2= Half-way point of the scale: you probably saw the motion
direction; 3= Between 2 and 4: you saw the motion direction, but
not too well; 4= You saw clearly the motion direction.
Experimental design and data analyses
For each trial, the dependent variables were the actual viewing
time (which in turn was determined by the urgency condition and
the response time), the response direction, and the PA score. As for
the independent variables, we used a randomized mixed design
with 5 factors: motion direction (within-subjects factor, 2 levels:
right/left), response modality (between-subjects factor, 2 levels:
saccade/verbal response), stimulus coherence (within-subjects
factor, 4 levels: 0%, 15%, 30%, 60%), urgency (within-subjects
factor, 4 levels: 0.2 s, 0.5 s, 1 s, 4 s), repetition (N=8), and block
(N=5). Each block consisted of a single experimental session with
256 trials (average duration: ,1 hour, including pauses), for a total
of 1280 trials per subject. Participants were invited to take pauses
whenever they wished or felt tired. The five blocks were normally
administered in different days.
By means of an interactive computer program we determined
the onset of saccades (the moment at which the instantaneous
horizontal eye velocity exceeded 30 deg?s
21 for more than 15 ms),
and verbal responses (the moment at which the envelope of the
vocal emission exceeded the noise level). At this stage, 87 trials
(,0.8% of the total) were eliminated due to residual artifacts that
went unnoticed during the data acquisition phase.
Within the framework of Signal Detection Theory (SDT, [22]),
the observers’ sensitivity in the rating task was assessed through
both area and distance measures. We used the non-parametric
index A’, which estimates the area under the ROC (Receiver
Operating Characteristics) curve (AUC), as well as the distance
index d’. The area under the ROC curve is 0.5 when the
performance is at chance, while it is 1.0 when the performance is
errorless. The corresponding values for d’ are 0.0 and ‘. The
response bias was assessed by calculating the location criterion c=
2K[z(H)+z(F)], which is independent of d’. We treated the rating
task as a multiple yes/no detection task: For each observer, and for
each coherence and urgency condition, we calculated hits (on
signal trials: coherent motion) and false alarms (on noise trials:
coherence =0%) over four response combinations. Given the five
PA scores used in our experiment, there were four possible pairs of
hits and false alarms rates. That is, PA scores greater than 0 were
first considered to be ‘yes’ responses, while the 0 score was
considered to be a ‘no’ response; next, PA scores greater than 1
were considered to be ‘yes’ responses, while PA scores less than 2
were considered to be ‘no’ responses, and so on, until
encompassing all pairs of hits and false alarms rates. In the
control experiment, in which the rating task was replaced by a
yes/no task, d’ was computed simply as z(H)–z(F). In the motion
discrimination task d’ was computed also as z(H)–z(F), where hits
are the correct responses to an arbitrary stimulus direction (in our
case rightward), and false alarms are the correct responses to the
other stimulus direction. To adjust for extreme values, the entries
in the contingency tables have been increased by 0.25 [23].
The degree of correlation between the performance in the
discrimination task and subjective visibility was assessed with the
non-parametric Kendall t, which tested the trial-by-trial relation-
ship between the correctness of the discrimination response (a
binary variable) and the PA score [24]. The discrimination rate
was tested against chance with the one-tail binomial test (alpha
level =0.01). We used repeated-measures ANOVAs to test the
significance of the discrimination rate, AUC, and PA scores (all
values were z-transformed, with the latter previously re-scaled in
the 0.5–1 range) over coherence (excluding 0%) and urgency
conditions. Separate repeated-measures ANOVAs were used to
assess the significance of d’. Pair-wise comparisons at each urgency
and coherence conditions were tested with the paired Student t.
Results
Overall, the discrimination rate was positively correlated with
the PA score (t=0.342, p,0.001, Figure 2). Observers discrim-
inated motion direction rather well (between 87.1% and 98.8%
across subjects, excluding stimuli with coherence =0%), even at
PA=0, where the average discrimination rate was 68% (with no
significant difference between saccadic and verbal response trials,
64% and 71%, respectively). The latter values were significantly
higher than chance (p,0.001), suggesting that motion could be
processed to a considerable degree even when its direction was
subjectively invisible. The significantly better-than-chance perfor-
Figure 2. General relationship between motion discrimination
and perceptual awareness. Black symbols: mean proportion of
correct responses (chance level =0.5) at each PA score. The grey
histogram represents the frequency distribution of PA scores. Data are
collapsed over urgency and coherence (excluding coherence =0%).
Bars: 6 S.E.M. across subjects.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017079.g002
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discrimination rates comprised between 57% and 87%.
The correlation between motion discrimination and perceptual
awareness seems to run counter the existence of a dissociation
between decision and awareness [21]. However, while the
significant correlation may indicate some common sensory
processing, when discriminating motion observers may exploit
the (same) sensory signal better than when making a perceptual
judgment ([25]; see also [26]). Because processing degraded
motion is time-consuming, it is possible that the discrimination
decision and perceptual awareness increase jointly with both
stimulus coherence viewing time, but with the former being
systematically superior to the latter. As a consequence, it should
take longer for perceptual awareness to build up.
As urgency decreased – and viewing time increased – both the
mean discrimination performance and the mean subjective
visibility increased (Figure 3A–C; main effect of urgency on
discrimination rate: p=0.002; on PA score: p,0.001), but
perceptual awareness tended to saturate well after the discrimina-
tion rate. About 600 ms after stimulus onset the percentage of
correct responses at coherence =60% had already reached 99%,
whereas perceptual awareness was clearly still increasing over
time. The median values of PA were very similar to the mean
values (not shown).
In order to compare the discrimination task and the rating task
with the same metrics, we estimated the area under the ROC
curve (AUC) in the rating task, which according to SDT
corresponds to the proportion of correct responses that would be
obtained should an unbiased observer had performed a 2-
alternatives forced-choice (2afc) detection task (area theorem,
[22]). The AUC increased with viewing time (main effect of
urgency, p=0.004), and remained always below the motion
discrimination rate (main effect of task, p,0.001), until it saturated
at the highest stimulus strength. Remarkably, a clear growth of
AUC – as well as perceptual awareness – was still well visible in
correct trials (83% of total trials, Supporting Figure S1), which
means that selecting correct responses is not a sufficient criterion
to ensure that awareness is already stabilized, even with relatively
long viewing times.
The AUC is an intuitive measure because it expresses the
detection performance in terms of percent correct. However, it
assumes an unbiased observer. Moreover, our discrimination task
was not a 2afc comparison task, but a 2afc identification task, as
each trial contained only one stimulus [22], which may imply a
lower performance. Therefore, depending on the amount of bias,
the performance difference between the two tasks may not be fully
reflected in the AUC-based analysis. We thus compared the two
tasks also in terms of the distance metrics d’ (Figure 3D–F), which
estimates the system sensitivity to sensory signals independently of
response criterion, and bias, which estimates the response criterion
independently of sensitivity (see Methods). In the rating task, the
sensitivity indicated the capability to separate rightward or
leftward motion from noise, while in the discrimination task the
sensitivity indicated the capability to separate rightward from
leftward motion. Because both the discrimination and the rating
tasks were performed on the same – single – stimulus, no !2
correction for 2-intervals vs. 1-interval task design was applied
[27]. This analysis showed that d’ increased with both viewing
time and stimulus coherence (main effect of urgency, p,0.001;
main effect of coherence, p,0.001), and in the rating task it
remained lower than in the discrimination task (main effect of task,
p,0.001, p,0.001, and p=0.018 at coherence =15%, 30%, and
60%, respectively). Note that d’ values in the order of 4–5 standard
deviations indicate a very large separation between the internal
Figure 3. Time-course of discrimination capability and perceptual awareness. A–C: Effects of coherence and urgency on discrimination
rate, perceptual awareness and AUC. Perfect discrimination (100%) corresponds to maximal AUC (A’=1) and full visibility (PA=4), while chance
discrimination (50%) corresponds to zero-sensitivity (A’=0.5) and null visibility (PA=0). Note however that the PA scale is not linear with respect to
the other two measures. The values are plotted on the horizontal axis in correspondence of the mean viewing time, and represent means 6 S.E.M.
across subjects. Black arrows: offset of the fixation dot in each urgency condition. Time zero represents stimulus onset. D–F: Effects of coherence and
urgency on sensitivity and response criterion. Same convention as in A–C.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017079.g003
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the more d’ increases, the less the performance increases in terms
of percent correct.
The response criterion is plotted in figure 3D–F. In the rating
task positive values indicate the tendency to give low PA scores,
and in the discrimination task positive values indicate a preference
to respond ‘‘left’’. In the rating task, the changes in the response
criterion paralleled the changes in sensitivity, as it decreased with
decreasing urgency and increasing coherence (p,0.002 in both
cases). That is, top-down components tending to decrease the
perceptual judgment were more prominent with shorter and
weaker motion stimuli, when less external information is available.
By contrast, the response criterion in the motion discrimination
task was never significantly different from zero (always p.0.1,
except at urgency =4 s and coherence =15%, p=0.041, one-
sample Student t).
We found no significant differences between the saccade and
the verbal response trials (p.0.15 for every F-test containing the
response modality as factor), suggesting that the mode of response
is irrelevant in this kind of perceptual decision.
The pattern of result was very robust both within and between
observers, despite the different inter-individual responsiveness to
different stimulus coherences (Supporting Figure S2). Distinct
time-courses of motion discrimination rate, AUC and perceptual
awareness – as well as sensitivity and criterion – were also clearly
visible when pooling the data for task performance instead of
stimulus coherence (Supporting Figure S3).
To describe in more details the temporal evolution of subjective
motion visibility, we calculated also the instantaneous cumulative
frequency of individual PA scores over time (Figure 4A). For
simplicity, the trials with PA score between 1 and 3 were pooled
into a single category of ‘‘intermediate visibility’’ (magenta). The
other categories were ‘‘blind’’ trials (PA score =0, blue) and ‘‘full
visibility’’ trials (PA score =4, red). We reconstructed the time-
course of subjective visibility by plotting, for each urgency
condition, the proportion of blind, intermediate visibility, and full
visibility trials at the time the total cumulative frequency
distribution reached 95%. The resulting visibility curves (thick
lines, Figure 4B) depicted the rise of full visibility over time, and
the fall of invisibility, with intermediate visibility first increasing
and then decreasing. Note that, especially at 15% coherence, there
was an initial time window after stimulus onset in which blind
trials predominated. In these trials, the discrimination rate (blue
squares) was better than chance (always p,0.001 except in one
case), but the rapid fading of invisibility implied that fully
unconscious motion processing was short-lived. Clearly, there
must be a point in time where, by further decreasing response
times, also the discrimination rate in blind trials would drop to
chance level. Due to the lower bound of response times, we could
not explore a closer temporal proximity of stimulus onset.
Figure 4. Cumulative frequency of PA scores over time (A) and visibility curves (B). A: Trials were subdivided in full visibility trials (PA=4,
red), intermediate visibility trials (PA=1–3, magenta), and blind trials (PA=0, blue). Time zero is motion onset. The curves with the squares represent
the instantaneous motion discrimination rate, where the grey tone maps linearly the number of trials (total cumulative frequency distribution; white
= no trials, black =100%). The vertical dotted lines indicate the moment at which the total cumulative trial frequency reached 95%, at which time the
value of each cumulate frequency of PA scores was sampled to build the visibility curves illustrated in panel B. The short vertical arrows indicate the
disappearance of the fixation dot (imperative cue) at each urgency condition. Data from all observers were pooled together. Bin width =250 ms. B:
Visibility curves. Temporal evolution of the frequency of the three classes of PA scores (circles and thick curves). Also plotted is the time-course of
discrimination rate for each class (squares and thin curves). The fitted curves for null and full visibility trials were obtained with a 3-parameters
exponential function, while the curves for intermediate visibility were obtained by subtracting from 100 the sum of the instantaneous values of the
functions of null and full visibility trials, so that the total instantaneous probability was always 1. We assumed that at the time of stimulus onset the
blind trials would represent the totality of the potential responses (100%), with both the intermediate and full visibility trials being absent (0%). The
fitted curves for the discrimination rate were obtained with a 2-parameters exponential function, under the assumption that at the time of stimulus
onset the discrimination rate would be at chance (50%). The discrimination rate was computed only when the number of trials on which it was based
was .10% of the trials in each urgency condition. The fitting models served only descriptive purposes. Time zero represents stimulus onset. Data
from all observers are pooled together.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017079.g004
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very initial moments of the build-up of motion discrimination
capability and perceptual awareness. Again, we found no
substantial differences between saccades and verbal response trials
(not shown).
Assessing the subjective motion visibility after the discrimination
task might somewhat underestimate the visibility at the time of
discrimination, because of possible masking effects of the visual
transient at the cessation of the stimulus, or simply because of the
delay between the two tasks. We checked this point in a control
experiment, in which we asked observers to make the perceptual
judgment at the time of the imperative cue. However, especially at
higher urgencies, it was very difficult for the observers to rate on the
5-points scale the subjective visibility of the motion stimulus shortly
after stimulus onset, as evidently this task requires a certain
minimum time to be accomplished. Therefore, we replaced the
perceptual task based on the 5-points rating with an easier y/n task,
in which observers had just to respond verbally ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ for
‘‘motion seen’’ or ‘‘motion unseen’’, respectively. In a first condition
observers had to give the y/n response at the time of the imperative
cue (speeded y/n task). The performance in this task was compared
to a condition in which the y/n response was given after motion
discrimination (delayed y/n task), a condition that replicated the
temporal structure of the main experiment, where the PA score was
reported after the discrimination response. The two sensitivity
curves (d’) were almost overlapping in the two tasks (Supporting
FigureS4),aswellasthecurvesofthecriterion(c),andnosignificant
differences were detected in sensitivity (always p.0.26 for every F-
test containing the task as factor), criterion (always p.0.27), or
viewing time (always p.0.10). Pair-wise comparisons of sensitivity
between the two tasks also failed to reach significance (always
p.0.065). These data suggest that in the main experiment the
reported motion visibility (PA scores) indeed reflected the subjective
visibility at the time of the discrimination response.
Discussion
This study has documented a higher performance in the motion
discrimination task compared to the rating task. That is, observers
identified the global motion direction with a forced-choice
procedure better than expected on the basis of the reported
subjective visibility of the same motion stimulus. Because of the
long integration time of our motion stimuli, this performance
difference translated into a longer buildup of perceptual awareness
relative to the buildup of motion discrimination capabilities. The
buildup of perceptual awareness was associated to a slow rise of full
visibility trials after stimulus onset that gradually replaced the
short-lasting blind trials and the more long-lasting intermediate
visibility trials. Observers showed good or even perfect discrim-
ination before perceptual awareness reached a steady-state, even
when blind trials were still predominant, in which case a fleeting
‘‘blindsight-like’’ mode [24,28] contributed a modest but signifi-
cant discrimination performance (even though patients with
lesions to V1 do not normally discriminate the direction of
random-dot motion in their blind field [29]). These data suggest
that speeded decisions about motion direction can exploit
degraded visual information better than – and thus before –
conscious perception.
Task differences may contribute to the superiority of motion
discrimination. For example, depending on the similarity of the
stimulus attributes actually used in the two tasks, the separation
between rightward and leftward motion signals underlying the
discrimination response may be larger than the separation
between motion and noise signals underlying the PA rating (see
[22], p. 191). However, it is doubtful that observers could take
advantage of this difference of sensory information with only one
stimulus available, as no stimulus comparison was made. We
predict that the same results would be obtained if observers had to
make speeded discrimination of motion and noise stimuli, instead
of rightward and leftward stimuli.
The pattern of results was the same regardless of whether
motion discrimination was accomplished with a saccade or a
verbal response, which ruled out that speeded responses depended
on a dedicated visuo-motor reflex by-passing the circuitry for
visual perception. This could reflect the fact that our saccadic task
was not primarily a motor-oriented task (the saccadic component
was incidental), in which case automatic sensorimotor responses
faster than visual perception could indeed be expected [8,30].
Also, the relatively long timescale of the task excluded that motion
discrimination was carried out in a single pass of feed-forward
cortical processing, which would act within ,100–200 ms [31,32].
Rather, we were facing a more general dissociation between
intuitive or even blind decisions and the rather sluggish perceptual
awareness [4], a dissociation that tended to disappear once full
subjective visibility was attained, at which time motion discrim-
ination became perceptually-driven.
Speeding up the discrimination response by imposing urgency
to the task, was paid with a decrease of both discrimination
performance and perceptual awareness. While the former effect is
a manifestation of the well-known speed-accuracy trade-off [33],
the latter effect implies an analogous trade-off between speed and
awareness, but shifted in time. This is interesting because it
suggests that, regardless of which particular compromise between
speed and accuracy is set in a difficult perceptual decision,
subjective visibility is always sacrificed, even when discrimination
accuracy is maximal, except for very long viewing times. Indeed,
in some observers the subjective visibility rose slowly over time,
whereas the discrimination performance reached 100% almost
immediately after stimulus onset (Supporting Figure S2).
Assessing perceptual awareness
This study addressed the issue of conscious perception.
Consciousness is in the first place regarded, both in popular and
scientific psychology, as a subjective, private phenomenon. As
such, it appears to be ultimately inaccessible to a third-person
approach. This notion of consciousness corresponds roughly to
what the philosopher Ned Block termed phenomenal conscious-
ness [34]. The distinction between phenomenal consciousness and
access consciousness (i.e., a conscious state that is not entirely
private) justifies the distinction between a purely phenomenolog-
ical approach to consciousness, and the approach typical of
scientific psychology and neurosciences. However, this passage is
far from obvious [35], and enduring disputes about the nature of
consciousness persist, as also witnessed by the polysemy of the term
consciousness, and the variety of related terms and qualifiers.
Throughout the paper we use the terms ‘‘awareness’’, ‘‘conscious-
ness’’, ‘‘phenomenal’’, ‘‘sensation’’, ‘‘subjective visibility’’, as
synonyms, and are intended to denote the first-person visual
experience of ‘‘seeing’’, whereas the term ‘‘perception’’ is used in a
rather liberal way. The difficulty to assess conscious perception in
controlled experiments, in particular, gave rise to endless
methodological discussions as to the best approach to conscious-
ness, and what counts as index of conscious experience – e.g.,
direct vs. indirect, objective vs. subjective measures [18,25,36].
In order to capture as directly as possible the first-person,
subjective quality of visual experience, while at the same time
keeping an objective stance, we took as a primary index of visual
consciousness the explicit visibility judgments given by the observers
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degreesofsubjectivevisibilitywithoutconstrainingvisualperception
intheProcrusteanbedoftheconscious/unconscious dichotomy(see
Methods), an issue that is particularly cogent under uncertainty
conditions. Although a perceptual judgment may be regarded to
involve meta-cognitive processes distinct from the ‘‘genuine’’
phenomenal fact, we preferred here to avoid such a clear-cut
separation, andconsideredsimple perceptual judgmentsasthe basic
unit of measurable, subjective perceptual experience. That is, we
tried as much as possible to go to the heart of conscious visual
perception by tagging the natural notion of ‘‘seeing’’ – regardless of
its fuzzy or illusory nature – from the point of view of the observer.
A posteriori, the observers’ perceptual judgments turned out to
be both reliable and veridical. They were reliable, because the
pattern of results was very systematic, both within and between
observers. They were veridical, because when the stimulus was
pure noise (coherence =0%), the reported visibility of global
motion direction was almost null (mean PA scores ranging from
0.08 to 0.16 over urgency levels, not shown), and because
especially at the highest stimulus coherence and long viewing time
perfect visibility was easily attained (PA score =4). That is,
observers used the entire PA scale without difficulty.
Note that despite our observers were carefully instructed to
assign a zero score only when they didn’t see at all the global
stimulus direction, it is possible in principle that a zero visibility
score could in fact tag sometimes cases in which visibility was not
truly ‘‘null’’, but simply not worth a score of one. However, a
visual experience that for a normal observer is not even worth a
minimum visibility judgment should be labeled ‘‘blindness’’, and
therefore we took the trials with PA=0 as trials in which observers
were blind to motion direction in a substantial way (blind trials).
By using SDT we aimed at providing a common currency for
quantifying the performance in the two tasks, and at assessing the
contribution of top-down and bottom up components in the
perceptual judgment (criterion and sensitivity), without however
pretending that perceptual awareness is entirely captured by a
single objective quantity [36]. Yet, we believe that combining a
somewhat qualitative approach (e.g., Figure 4) with a quantitative
analysis based on the transformation of the visibility ratings into an
equivalent detection performance (e.g., Figure 3) is a simple way to
capture satisfactorily the subjective quality of perceptual experi-
ence while at the same time remaining within a robust
methodological framework (see also [37]).
Perceptual decisions can precede awareness
When considering the temporal dynamics of perception, the
superiority of motion discrimination capability over subjective
motion perception has an interesting consequence: awareness and
discrimination become dissociated in time, i.e., perceptual
awareness lags discrimination, in the sense that it takes longer to
reach the same performance level and to stabilize. This does not
imply strictly serial processes, as the processes underlying
discrimination and awareness can coexist in time (race model).
Note that we are not suggesting to take the saturation of perceptual
awareness as the temporal marker of the perceptual delay; Rather,
its gradual buildup suggests that the notion of a precise point in
time where conscious perception is realized may be too strict, at
least with our degraded motion stimuli.
That perceptual awareness is more sluggish than motion
discrimination may appear somewhat unsettling, as we tend often
to assume that conscious perception precedes decision. However,
phenomena such as blindsight [24,28] and unconscious perception
[18,25] suggest that automatic decisions are indeed possible under
certain conditions. In more ordinary contexts, many sensory-
driven actions, as well as the stimuli that originated them, pass
mostly unnoticed, as when driving or in sports. Similarly, we
incessantly decide where to make the next gaze shift, despite poor
or null awareness of peripheral - and sometimes also central -
visual information [38,39]. Awareness may just follow.
In general, a slow dynamics of perceptual awareness may reflect
the need to go beyond the contingencies of a continuously changing
world. For example, if the temporal dynamics of perceptual
awareness were strictly tuned to the timing of exploratory eye
movements, we would probablysee the world as a rapid sequence of
snapshots, one for each fixation period. Indeed, we recently found
that a spontaneous increase of the saccadic latency from ,200 to
,500 ms resulted in a progressive increase of their susceptibility to
an illusory mislocalization effect [8], which suggested that
perceptual awareness of the target position lagged short-latency
saccades (blind saccades). Also, very fast responses to natural objects
(,100 ms, [40]), and even more so the amazingly fast color
discrimination capability recently discovered in the monkey
(,30 ms, [41]), call for an automatic process that may not wait
for conscious perception [31]. Thus, transient dissociations, long or
short, between decision and perception may be the rule, rather than
the exception, during everyday life, in the sense that our sluggish
perceptual awareness can lag visually-guided motor responses
[8,9,30], action selection [42], perceptual decisions [41], and even
intuitive choices [43]. Another reason why awareness should be
delayed is that, in order to experience the world as unitary despite
the various asynchronies deriving from multiple sensory (and also
non-sensory) signals, a buffer system is needed that accommodates
all possible asynchronies; The readout of a buffered system is by
necessity delayed. A general picture thus arises that depicts
awareness as a post-hoc construct emerging on the top of a
developing or even mature decision, both when the stimulus is
internal, as in unconscious initiation of a voluntary motor act [7], or
external, as in the present study.
In disentangling decision from conscious perception, our study
warns against an indiscriminate use of monkeys’ saccadic eye
movement as a proxy for conscious visual perception (e.g., for
what monkeys ‘‘see’’), even when accuracy is rewarded [1,2,3].
More generally, our findings indicate that, especially when time is
an issue, objective forced-choice responses may not provide a full
account of visual perception, as the perceptual decision can be
taken when the formation of perceptual awareness is still
underway. Note that in our data there was a non-negligible
proportion of intermediate visibility trials in which observers
anticipated the imperative cue, which is a hint that even well-
trained observers may tend to respond somewhat automatically
before perceptual awareness is stabilized. In the less corticalized
monkey, automatic visuo-motor decisions could be even more
pronounced. Thus, because selecting correct responses is a too
lenient criterion to ensure that perceptual awareness is already
stabilized, it would be important to measure directly the degree of
monkey’s perceptual awareness, an issue that however is
theoretically far from obvious [35,44]. Building upon past work
[45,46,47], it might perhaps be possible to train monkeys to pair
the motion discrimination response with a simplified rating task for
perceptual awareness. In principle, comparing the buildup of
perceptual awareness and perceptual decisions in monkeys would
permit to assess how much their visual awareness is flattened to the
swift dynamics of a perceptual decision.
Seeing global motion: neural correlates of conscious
vision
How can a perceptual decision be taken when perceptual
awareness is still developing? At least for global motion direction,
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regulate the formation of the decision signal from the underlying
visual signal. Several findings, both in humans and monkeys,
indicate area MT as a crucial node for motion processing (see [48]
for review). In recent years a growing body of data have disclosed
also the role of area LIP (Lateral Intraparietal) in perceptual
decisions involving motion stimuli (see [3] for review). When a
monkey is instructed to make an eye movement to report the
direction of a random-dot kinematogram, neurons in LIP pick up
sensory evidence, presumably from MT, and integrate it for some
hundreds of ms until a decision bound is reached, and an
oculomotor command issued. Importantly, the decision is reached
even when the stimulus is still available or the response
procrastinated, because LIP neurons exploit only the initial part
of the discharge of MT neurons [49,50]. Thus, monkey LIP seems
to work as a device that implements a relatively quick rise-to-
threshold mechanism for various types of visuo-motor responses
when a perceptual decision is required [51]. In this way, the
decision is ready even though MT neurons are still processing the
motion input. Note that structures other than LIP could be
involved in motion discrimination when the response is verbal,
perhaps as part of a circuit for more abstract decision-making [4],
although the fact that we found a pattern of results virtually
identical for saccades and verbal responses suggests that similar
mechanisms may be at play.
Perceptual awareness would instead require a longer processing
of visual signals. At a first sight, the long discharge of MT neurons,
that outlasts the perceptual decision, could be thought of as the
neural basis for the formation of visual awareness for motion.
However, in the anaesthetized monkey, MT neurons respond
promptly to the onset of random dot motion, and the information
rate saturates very quickly (within ,100 ms, [52]. Obviously, such
automatic, almost time-invariant response cannot give rise to
perceptual awareness, and is rather involved in smooth pursuit
initiation. Moreover, in the awake monkey the sensitivity to global
motion of individual MT neurons, while increasing over time (for
about 2 seconds), is comparable to the sensitivity of motion
discrimination of both monkeys and humans, as assessed through
coherence threshold [53]. Yet, we showed that, at least in humans,
the sensitivity in the discrimination task is higher than the
sensitivity in the rating task. Thus, if the same holds for monkeys,
the sensitivity of MT neurons would be too high to be compatible
with perceptual awareness. Therefore, a distinct, sub-optimal
readout mechanism should be hypothesized, perhaps through the
pooling a sub-population of MT neurons containing a large
amount of correlated noise that collectively have a lower signal-to-
noise ratio than those feeding LIP for a perceptual decision [54].
Thus, in this scenario neither MT nor LIP are sufficient for the
formation of perceptual awareness, as at least an additional
readout mechanism would be required, exhibiting integration
properties compatible with the slow buildup of perceptual
awareness. Clearly, an alternative scenario is that in the monkey
motion discrimination and perceptual awareness are not dissoci-
ated, in which case monkeys may have only an immediate, faint
subjective sense of motion, in principle entirely accountable by the
activity in MT/LIP.
In humans, the contribution of area MT to motion awareness
remains a matter of speculation [55], although findings such as
that a bilateral damage to this region causes motion blindness [56],
or that implied and imagined motion activate MT [57,58], or that
MT exhibits spatiotopic properties [59], suggest an important role
in high-level motion processing. To shed light on the role of
human MT in the buildup of awareness of global motion, it would
be important to know whether its temporal integration properties
are compatible with the long buildup of perceptual awareness or
whether they just comply with the relatively quick dynamics of
perceptual decisions. Because temporal summation in human MT
does not appear to be very long-lasting when tested with stimuli
similar to those employed in our study (M.C. Morrone, personal
communication), it is doubtful that this cortical structure can fully
support the slow buildup of perceptual awareness for motion.
Thus, it would seem that MT can be considered a high-level area
as far as global motion processing is concerned, but a low-level
area as far as the associated subjective quality of motion vision is
concerned.
The above considerations do not exclude that neural circuits in
MT and/or LIP may take part in an early phase of perceptual
elaboration as a precursor of conscious perception. MT could
contribute to form a faint feeling of motion, as in motion imagery
[57,58,60], perhaps reinforced by multiple connections with
earlier striate and extrastriate areas (especially human V3A, whose
response to motion is remarkable [61]), or by the recruitment of
other cortical circuits [13,30,62]. Decision-related activity in LIP
may contribute to form the subjective confidence in the
discrimination performance [46], which depends on an internal
evaluation of both one’s own decisional capability and the degree
of awareness of the stimulus [19]. The involvement of a sensori-
motor area such as LIP in visual perception would be generally in
line also with current views of embodied cognition and motor
theories of perception [63].
In sum, among the mosaic of visual areas activated by global
motion in humans [64], only those supporting temporal
integration properties compatible with the slow buildup of
perceptual awareness would candidate as a specific neural
correlate of consciousness, sufficient to confer us the full
phenomenic depth of motion perception. Clearly, a less simplistic
view is that awareness is a large-scale, distributed property [13], in
which case no single cortical structure may exhibit a macroscopic
activation that co-varies on its own with the conscious percept.
Conclusions
Our study has documented a remarkable capability of identifying
thedirectionofdegradedmotion,withasaccadeoraverbalresponse,
at a time after stimulus onset when motion is stillsubjectivelyinvisible
or poorly visible. This sort of ‘‘transient blindsight’’ suggests that
many ordinary perceptual decisions – not necessarily motor – can be
effectively taken when our sluggish conscious representation of the
world is still a void or a faint impression. As a consequence, forced
perceptual decisions may not tell the entire story about visual
perception, especially when time is an issue.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Time-course of perceptual awareness for
correct responses. Conventions as in Figure 3 of the main text.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Individual performance. Same as Figure 3 of the
main text, but the data are presented for each individual observer
(‘S#’), and for each response modality (‘s’ for saccade trials, ‘v’ for
verbal response trials). The thickness of the box around the plots
tags the grouping criterion used to pool the data for task
performance (see Figure S3). Each layer of the figure contains
the data relative to one observer and one response modality.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Time-course of discrimination capability and
perceptual awareness, pooled by task performance. For
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discrimination rate, AUC and perceptual awareness saturated at
all urgency conditions (e.g., coherence =60% for S1s in Figure
S2). The ‘‘High coherences’’ panel included data relative to the
immediately lower coherence (panels labeled with a black thick
box, Figure S2). The ‘‘Low coherences’’ panel included data
relative to the next lower coherence (gray boxes of Figure S2). If
no joint saturation was attained (in S4s, S3v, S4v), the data from
coherence =60% were included in the ‘‘High coherence’’ group.
Only seven subjects formed the ‘‘Low coherences’’ group, because
in subject S2v the lowest tested coherence (15%) pertained to the
‘‘High coherences’’ group.
(TIF)
Figure S4 Control experiment. Sensitivity (d’, continuous
lines) and criterion (c, dotted lines) in the yes/no task. The red
symbols (delayed y/n) refer to a condition in which the y/n
response was given after the motion discrimination task, a
condition that mimicked the main experiment. The yellow
symbols (speeded y/n) refer to a condition in which the same
observers were forced to give the y/n response immediately after
the imperative cue (in place of the motion discrimination
response). The mean discrimination rate in the delayed y/n
condition was 77%, 89%, 96%, respectively for 15%, 30%, and
60% coherence. Same conventions as in Figure 3D–F of the main
text.
(TIF)
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